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Introduction 
 
The smuggling of illegal narcotics into the UK by way of internal 
concealment poses unique challenges, not simply in terms of the 
detection and apprehension of suspected individuals, but in the 
provision of care and any subsequent medical attention they may 
require. Recognition of the potential risks faced by such detainees and 
the need to ensure their safety and wellbeing during the jurisdictional 
process is essential.  
 
At present, variable factors affect the care and management of 
individuals who, amongst other terms, are referred to as ‘Body-
Stuffers’, ‘Body-Packers’ and ‘Swallowers’. Collectively this population 
is described as Suspected Internal Drug Traffickers (SIDTs). SIDTs are 
managed by UKBA in a variety of different settings as the jurisdictional 
process unfolds, including the location where they are apprehended; 
on the way to and within the custodial setting; and the magistrates’ 
court where charges against them are made. In each environment, the 
situation risks complication due the potentially sudden and serious, but 
uncommon, occurrence of a medical emergency. Such an emergency 
may result from the rupture of a package containing drugs.  
 
While different methods of internal concealment must be taken into 
account, the likelihood and timing of such an event can often not be 
anticipated, particularly when SIDTs do not confirm whether they are 
smuggling drugs by internal concealment.1 Therefore, the training of 
custodial staff, the accessibility of appropriate healthcare facilities and 
the appropriate environment for the detention of those at risk are 
important concerns. The recommendations contained in this guidance 
are intended to assist in the ongoing development of clinical guidance 
on the care of such detainees, and to inform the future planning of 
services.   
 
The UK Border Agency (UKBA), which enforces immigration and 
customs regulations and manages border control for the UK has 
reported that approximately 150 SIDTs are detained at Heathrow 
Airport each year, with a trend towards the detention of fewer 
individuals over recent years.2 In the six-month period between 
August 2010 and January 2011, UKBA informed the group that 64 
SIDTs were detained. Over the last 25 years, 7 SIDTs have died in 
UKBA custody after arrest as a consequence of rupture of a package of 
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drugs concealed internally, with two of these deaths occurring since 
2006.3  
 
In May 2007, an inquest was held into the death of an individual who 
had arrived at Heathrow with approximately 1kg of cocaine concealed 
internally in the digestive tract and who later died whilst in the custody 
of HMRC. Following this inquest, the Coroner, Mr Andrew Walker, 
wrote to HMRC under Rule 43 of The Coroners’ Rules 1984 
recommending actions that could be taken to prevent the recurrence 
of such a fatality (Annex A). These recommendations were:  
 
• The development of a policy ‘[…] to take account of the medical 
care necessary where a detained person is believed to have 
swallowed drugs and has identified additional high risk factors 
[…]’; and 
 
• Provision of the ‘[…] opportunity for a consultation with an 
independent medical practitioner with appropriate training 
following a decision to charge a detained person who is 
suspected to have swallowed packages of drugs. This 
consultation should be separate from the attendance of a 
forensic medical examiner necessary before a person is charged.’ 
 
Following receipt of the Coroner’s letter, Mr Mike Eland CB, Director 
General of HMRC, wrote to the then Chief Medical Officer (CMO) for 
England, Sir Liam Donaldson. In his letter, Mike Eland highlighted a 
problem with HMRC’s contracted Forensic Medical Examiners (now 
referred to as Forensic Physicians) in various locations across the UK 
giving differing medical advice on the care of SIDTs and the difficulty 
this situation was creating for the formulation of national policy and 
application of uniform standards of care. Mr Eland sought the CMO’s 
help and advice in formulating Departmental and clinical guidance on 
the issue of the medical care of SIDTs, including for those groups 
deemed to be at high risk. (Annex B).  
 
Guidance was also sought on the HMRC policy, and current UKBA 
policy, of not ‘routinely’ seeking hospital admission for detainees with 
‘internal concealments’. This issue had arisen at the inquest, where 
medical opinion had both supported HMRC’s stance and considered 
that the individual in question would have died irrespective of where 
they had been detained. Legal argument on behalf of the individual’s 
family sought to persuade the court that HMRC was wrong in not 
sending the individual to hospital, but the court did not uphold this 
argument. The relatives registered a claim under the Human Rights 
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Act in the Central London County Court in 2008 and UKBA are 
currently exploring options before any decisions are made concerning 
the case. 
 
Since Sir Liam convened the Expert Group on the Medical Care of 
SIDTs, the group has benefited from a wide range of clinical expertise 
and has included representatives of the General Medical Council, 
Medical Royal Colleges, National Poisons Information Service, NHS 
service providers and UKBA. Members of the Expert Group visited 
Heathrow and the UKBA custody suite at Colnbrook, where they 
followed the pathway of custody from the apprehension of a suspect to 
their detention and this first hand evidence informs the 
recommendations made. 
 
The recommendations that the Group make are intended to bring 
clarity to the medical implications of the custodial pathway followed by 
SIDTs whilst in the detention of the UKBA, to highlight changes that 
could be made to improve the care and medical management of this 
group of detainees and provide a starting point for the development of 
detailed and comprehensive care pathways. The Group was not tasked 
with, or resourced to, work up detailed pathways of guidance, but the  
immediate implementation of simple mechanisms, such as a modified 
early warning system and a standardised protocol for the management 
of SIDTs, could improve the safety and wellbeing of detainees, and 
provide improved assurance of the quality of care offered by staff 
working in UKBA settings.  
 
Finally, given that health is a devolved government responsibility and 
the medical care of SIDTs whilst in custody is a UK wide issue, UKBA 
will wish to consider the applicability of the recommendations made 
here with appropriate health officials in Wales, Northern Ireland and 
Scotland. Differences in the delivery of healthcare services across the 
UK devolved administrations, particularly in England, suggest that 
UKBA may wish to consider such discussions a priority.  
 
 
 
Dr Anita Donley 
Chair of the Expert Group 
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Chapter 1: Background - The Custody and Detention of 
Suspected Internal Drug Traffickers at Present  
 
UKBA operates a number of custody suites, mainly at major ports and 
airports, including Heathrow, Gatwick, Birmingham, Dover and 
Manchester, with the suite at Heathrow dealing with over 80% of the 
total number of SIDTs apprehended by UKBA each year. The custody 
suites are operated in accordance with the statutory requirements set 
out in the Police & Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), and UKBA staff 
are obliged to abide by the Codes of Practice issued under that Act, 
particularly Code of Practice C.4  
 
In practice, UKBA custody suites operate differently to those of the 
police in dealing with individuals concealing drugs internally, 
something that is in part due to the different nature of the cases that 
each organisation usually deals with. The Expert Group was informed 
that police forces have found in recent years that those involved in 
drug dealing on the street typically swallow small amounts of drugs at 
low levels of purity in packages that are often inadequately wrapped - 
often in little more than a piece of cling film. These cases are generally 
referred to as ‘Body-Stuffers’. In contrast, UKBA SIDT cases usually 
involve drugs of high purity in large amounts that are wrapped more 
securely and which, in many cases, appear to be manufactured for the 
purpose; these cases are generally referred to as ‘Body-Packers’. 
Usually 75-100 individual packages are found, and on one occasion the 
quantity was over 1 kilogramme.5  
 
 
UKBA and Police Policy and Current Guidance 
 
There are at present notable divergences between UKBA and police 
policy, which it is useful to summarise.  
 
Police policy is that all detainees suspected of internally concealing 
drugs should be taken immediately to hospital, taking into account the 
possibility of the sudden release of such drugs from inadequate 
packaging. In contrast, UKBA guidance makes no such 
recommendation and, unless the individual becomes demonstrably 
unwell, these individuals remain in UKBA custody suites. The group 
were informed that it is current UKBA policy that all detainees with a 
suspected internal concealment should be transported as soon as 
possible to the custody suites at either Heathrow or Manchester where 
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there are care and monitoring facilities, with staff that UKBA consider 
to be competent in the management of these individuals and in the 
early identification of potential problems.  
 
All SIDTs detained in police custody are routinely assessed by a 
forensic physician or HCP to establish fitness to be detained. Detainees 
in UKBA custody are not routinely assessed by a forensic physician or 
HCP unless deemed advisable by custody staff. 
 
The Drugs Act 2005 amended the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the 
PACE Acts of England and Wales and Northern Ireland. Some of the 
amendments empowered the police, subject to a number of 
restrictions, to authorise intimate searches, X-rays and ultrasound 
scans of persons suspected of having concealed Class A drugs with the 
intention to supply or export them.  
 
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as amended by the Drugs 
Act 2005, provides grounds under which an intimate search for drugs 
may be carried out in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. This 
requires the authorisation of a police officer of the rank of Inspector or 
above, who has reasonable grounds for believing that a person has 
concealed a Class A drug which he or she intended to supply to others 
or to export and that an intimate search is the only practicable means 
of removing it. Such a search, when carried out for secreted drugs, 
must be carried out at a hospital or other medical premises (not a 
police station) by a suitably qualified person (defined as a registered 
medical practitioner or registered nurse). In these cases, the 
responsibility for performing the examination lies with the forensic 
physician/nurse and not the hospital doctor.6
 
UKBA officers have similar powers to the police to authorise intimate 
searches, again in the context of PACE, but have no powers to 
authorise the use of forensic imaging. In Scotland, a Sheriff’s warrant 
may authorise an intimate search, ‘in the interests of justice and to 
obtain evidence.  
 
The Drugs Act provides for a detainee to have an X-ray or ultrasound 
carried out if s/he is ‘…suspected of having swallowed a Class A drug 
and was in possession of it with appropriate criminal intention before 
his arrest’.  The imaging must be authorised by an officer of Inspector 
rank or above and must be performed by a registered medical 
practitioner or nurse at a hospital, doctor's surgery, or other medical 
premise.7   
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Code C of the revised PACE Act stipulates that where there is any 
doubt about the condition of a detainee, especially when substance 
misuse may be involved, ‘the police should always act urgently to call 
an appropriate healthcare professional or an ambulance’  
 
Similarly, the National Policing Improvement Agency’s draft protocol 
for the management of detainees that are suspected of swallowing or 
packing drugs recommends that the person arrested should be 
conveyed to hospital as quickly as possible as a medical emergency if 
the following conditions are present:  
 
• Reliable intelligence indicates that the individual has either 
ingested a package of drugs, or they are seen to do so, or admit 
having done so; or 
 
• Reliable intelligence indicates that the individual has a package 
of drugs or packages of drugs hidden in any intimate orifice.8  
 
Other existing guidance of note is the advice of the National Poisons 
Information Service, which can be found on TOXBASE, its 
computerised database.9 The Faculty of Forensic and Legal Medicine 
published guidance in September 2010 on Acute behavioural 
disturbance: guidelines on management in police custody, and The 
British Medical Association and the Faculty of Forensic and Legal 
Medicine have also published guidelines for doctors asked to perform 
intimate body searches.10  
 
 
Forensic Physicians  
 
Forensic Physicians (FP), previously referred to as Forensic Medical 
Examiners, are qualified doctors who practice in a variety of settings 
including contributing to the care of individuals in custody. The Royal 
College of Physicians Faculty of Forensic Medicine is the body that sets 
standards for specialist practice, and the Expert Group recommends 
that the evolution of UKBA policy is developed with the assistance of 
this group of experts.  
 
The Metropolitan Police issue a comprehensive set of guidelines, Good 
Practice Guidelines for Forensic Medical Examiners.11 The following is 
an excerpt from this guidance, which provides advice on detainees 
who have swallowed drugs:  
 
 8
If the FME is telephoned regarding a detained person who has 
swallowed drugs they should be aware of the advice contained in 
MPS Special Notice 37/97, which states that: 
 
‘A prisoner who has or is suspected of having swallowed drugs, 
must be treated as having taken an overdose and an ambulance 
should be called. If the prisoner refuses to go to hospital and 
declines any medical assistance the refusal should be noted on 
the custody record and their condition closely monitored for 
signs of deterioration. In these circumstances, the FME must be 
called. On arrival, a full assessment should be performed by the 
FME to consider whether hospital transfer is required. If so, the 
FME should explain to the detained person why such transfer is 
in their best interests.’  
 
 
The Transport of Detainees 
 
UKBA has four customised vehicles to facilitate the transfer of 
detainees. These vehicles are equipped with two cells and an on-board 
captive toilet, which allows for any waste matter passed to be removed 
hygienically and examined at static facilities in the receiving suite. 
Details of the various routes and the location of nearby hospitals are 
held in the vehicles, and staff undertaking these duties are supplied 
with mobile phones to contact emergency medical assistance if 
required. A first aid kit is also provided. Journey times can be 
significant due both to the distances involved, and because of the 
potential for traffic delays at certain times of the day - for example, 
Dover to Colnbrook is a journey of around 100 miles. UKBA informed 
the Group that UKBA officials do not routinely seek the advice of a FP 
on the advisability of transfer. There is reduced capacity for adequate 
monitoring of detainees’ health status and no clear guidance regarding 
the monitoring of detainees during such transfers. 
 
One result of UKBA’s transfer policy is that FPs in locations close to the 
main custody suites may have significantly more direct experience of 
the assessment of SIDTs than FPs working in other locations who 
encounter this population of detainees less frequently. Should the 
detainee be referred to hospital, UKBA officials are required to be with 
the detainee for the duration of the hospital stay. Were hospital 
referrals/admissions to become more frequent, this would potentially 
have implications in terms of workforce and service capacity for both 
UKBA and the Health Service. 
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The Risks of Internal Drug Concealment 
 
Individuals naive to any substance that they are carrying internally are 
at increased risk from the effects of package leakage, whereas 
habituated users will have some tolerance to the effect of the drug(s) 
they conceal.  In the event of a package leak, even habituated users 
are at risk from large doses of internally concealed drugs. The Expert 
Group was advised that this risk occurs mainly, but not exclusively, in 
Body-Packers, a group of SIDTs that is defined in the next chapter. 
 
The packages can cause gastrointestinal obstruction and this 
complication can arise regardless of the ingested agent and in the 
absence of package leak. The use of constipating agents by Packers 
increases the risk of obstruction. Affected individuals typically present 
with abdominal pain, vomiting (which may become blood stained 
and/or faeculant) and absence of flatus or faeces rectally.  
Cardiovascular collapse (fast heart rate, low blood pressure, impaired 
consciousness) may be present. Gastrointestinal obstruction is a 
medical emergency requiring immediate surgical treatment in most 
cases, although it is sometimes possible to remove the obstructing 
packages without the need for an open surgical operation.  
 
In the context of SIDTs, it is difficult to put a time course on the likely 
effects of any of the agents concealed or ingested, or to predict their 
kinetics with any accuracy.  As long as a leaking package is present in 
the body, it will act as a drug reservoir, releasing the agent(s) at an 
unpredictable rate.  Single, or multiple, packages may leak. A detailed 
review of the clinical pharmacology and toxicology of the drugs usually 
concealed by SIDTs is outside the scope of this guidance.   
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A Typical Pathway 
 
It is useful to outline a typical sequence of events that follows the 
apprehension of a SIDT, to remand in custody at Heathrow Airport. 
The following diagram illustrates this pathway:  
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Diagram 1 Pathway taken by detainee from identification as SIDT to 
remand in custody at Heathrow 
 
The initial intervention is at the UKBA control desk where a suspect 
passenger will be stopped and questioned, and a search of their 
baggage carried out. If an individual is suspected of smuggling drugs 
internally, they may be asked to consent to a scan using low dose X-
ray technology, which is available at the airport and operated by UKBA 
officers. Alternatively, or in addition, officers can authorise, with the 
consent of the suspect, a urine sample for testing. This procedure is 
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normally carried out under section 62 of PACE on suspects who have 
been arrested and notified of their rights as set out in the PACE Codes 
of Practice. UKBA officers can also authorise intimate searches.  
 
If UKBA suspicions have been confirmed by X-ray results, the 
individual will be arrested and transferred to the Colnbrook custody 
suite at Heathrow. SIDTs already under arrest will be transferred if a 
urine sample has confirmed the presence of drugs. The receiving 
Custody Officer will then ascertain if there are adequate grounds for 
detention and complete a custody record that accompanies the 
detainee wherever they are moved. A Person Escort Record (PER) form 
is also completed whenever the detainee is moved, and accompanies 
them in transit. The PACE Act requires that detainees are made aware 
of, and have access to, legal and medical advice without prejudice or 
unnecessary delay. It also requires that competent and independent 
language translation is made available. 
   
At this point a SIDT would be assessed by a FP if: 
 
• Additional health problems arise. For example, detainees are not 
allowed to self-administer drugs prescribed for pre-existing 
conditions whilst in custody and these must be administered by, 
or on instruction from, a FP. 
 
• The detained individual shows signs of problems related to the 
drug suspected to have been ingested, as judged by custody 
staff. The Custody Officer (on the basis of Codes of Practice and 
their experience) will either request a FP to assess the 
individual; or, if they adjudge the situation to be urgent and 
serious, will call the emergency services and a FP 
simultaneously. 
 
Next, the case will be referred to the UKBA Criminal and Financial 
Investigation Team based at Staines. The detainee is then assigned an 
Investigating Officer who will examine the evidence and interview the 
detainee under caution on audiotape, allowing opportunity for the 
detainee to make a statement. Where the Investigating Officer 
believes there is enough evidence to charge the individual, the case 
will be reported to the Crown Prosecution Service, which will review 
the evidence and make the decision to charge. 
 
The detainee will then be taken to Heathrow North Side Police Station 
and charged with an offence of being knowingly concerned in the 
importation of a controlled drug, contrary to section 170 of the 
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Customs and Excise Management Act 1979.12 The detainee may be 
held at the police station before being transferred to Uxbridge 
Magistrates Court where they may be remanded in custody to allow for 
the preparation of case papers. Where the detainee has still to pass all 
of the drug packages, the court will remand them back into UKBA 
custody under section 152 of Criminal Justice Act 1988.13  
 
Access to interpreters and legal services is intended to be provided in 
a timely fashion. The National Register of Public Service Interpreters is 
centrally managed by the Ministry of Justice which holds a list of 
interpreters for almost every language and in many locations.  The list 
is professionally accredited and security vetted. Access to an 
interpreter out-of-hours can usually be arranged, but telephone 
services are available if necessary. The Legal Services Commission 
arranges access to legal advice and solicitors, although there is some 
variability of access to solicitors nationally. 
 
In producing this guidance, the Expert Group was made aware of a 
number of variable factors that affect the custodial pathway followed 
by SIDTs in the UK, leading to a potential divergence in the quality of 
services made available. These issues are addressed in the following 
three chapters and some generic elements are listed as follows: 
 
• The location of a person when identified as a suspect;  
 
• The availability and appropriate use of clinical investigations. For 
example, access to a means for obtaining and analysing blood 
samples, imaging facilities and expert medical opinion where 
appropriate; 
 
• The distance and mode of transport from where an individual is 
apprehended to the place at which they are charged and 
remanded, including the custody suite;  
 
• The facilities available at the point at which the SIDT is held, 
including the custody suite. For example, live video surveillance 
of cells and availability of medical equipment; 
 
• The induction, education and training of custodial staff, 
particularly UKBA contractor employees, regarding the 
recognition of behavioural and physical signs of drug 
intoxication; 
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• The level of induction, education and training of FPs in different 
locations nationally; 
 
• The consistency of policies and procedures in various locations 
and at various points in the custodial pathway. For example, 
SIDTs held by UKBA and in police custody; 
 
• The audit and quality assurance framework for policies, 
procedures, induction, education and training of all involved in 
the care and management of SIDTs whilst in custody. 
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Chapter 2: The Care and Management of Suspected 
Internal Drug Traffickers  
 
The Expert Group felt that a comprehensive and coordinated approach 
to the effective monitoring, assessment and management of SIDTs 
would improve safety and assure the quality of care provided to this 
group of detainees by UKBA. The group concluded that 
operationalising standard protocols and pathways of care could achieve 
this. As a first step, standardisation of current practice by using a 
combination of urinalysis, X-ray and observation of physical condition 
will significantly improve on current practice. Such a standardisation of 
process should be developed as part of the protocols for monitoring of 
SIDTs in UKBA custody.  
 
This chapter provides guidance on the care and management of SIDTs 
in relation to the stages of the pathway that have been outlined. The 
chapter begins by focussing on the methods used in internal drug 
smuggling and the associated terminology used to describe these.  
 
 
4.1 - Terminology and Methods of Internal Concealment 
 
At present, confusion arises from the way in which responsible 
authorities attribute different meanings to a common lexicon that is 
used to describe those who conceal drugs internally, and there is a 
need for greater consistency.14 It is recommended that UKBA and 
those in the medical profession providing clinical services to SIDTs use 
those terms that pertain to the specific method of concealment. These 
subgroups are described under the following headings, along with an 
overview of associated evidence relating to incidence and outcome. It 
is worth noting that flexibility in the approach to the investigation, 
management and care of individuals engaged in different forms of 
internal drug concealment may be required.  
 
 
Body-Packers 
 
Body-Packers may ingest large quantities of packaged drugs, as much 
as a kilogramme, concealed in packages varying from a small number 
to 200 individual packages, but normally in the range of 75-100 
packages. While each package contains a potentially lethal amount of 
drug, these are now usually machine manufactured using a material 
that does not leak, resulting in a uniformity of size and weight. Four 
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different types of packaging have been described.15 While heroin used 
to be the drug of choice for Body-Packers this has been superseded by 
cocaine, with packages containing approximately 5–12 grams of the 
drug.16 Body-Packers sometimes ingest anticholinergics, such as 
diphenoxylate/atropine, to inhibit intestinal motility. This reduces 
potential for defecation during the journey and the subsequent loss or 
discovery of the drugs.17  
 
Since 1999, Hillingdon Hospital has received the majority of Body- 
Packers from Heathrow. Between January 2000 and January 2005, 
2,508 suspected Body-Packers were detained at Heathrow, of whom 
590 were referred to Hillingdon Hospital and 61 admitted. Abdominal 
pain was the most common presenting complaint, with an average 
number of 70 packets swallowed/passed. The majority (92%) of those 
admitted were managed conservatively. Six patients were treated 
successfully for cocaine poisoning and 5 required surgical removal of 
cocaine packets. There were no deaths.18
 
A study conducted at Ashford Hospital (two miles from London 
Heathrow Airport) between January 1996 and December 1999 
reported 572 cases of Body-Packers over a four year period.19 
Individuals assessed represented 27% of the total cases detained for 
smuggling by internal concealment into the UK over this period. One-
hundred-and-eighty individuals were shown to be carrying packages 
on X-ray.  Thirty-six cases were admitted with suspected overdose or 
gastrointestinal obstruction, of whom 7 required surgical intervention. 
No deaths occurred.  
 
Other large published series of relevance are summarised in a recent 
review by Booker et al.20 
 
Body-Stuffers 
 
In the case of ‘Body-Stuffers’, drugs are usually either unpackaged or 
poorly packaged and as a consequence leakage may occur over the 
hours following their ingestion, causing significant symptoms. Some 
individuals also hide illicit drug packages in the rectum or vagina with 
the same intent (these individuals are sometimes known as ‘Body- 
Pushers’).21 Drugs hidden by Stuffers in the vagina or rectum are less 
likely to cause significant symptoms, as the packages are not subject 
to the digestive processes. The features that develop will depend not 
only on the packaging, concentration and amount of the drug, but on 
whether the package was intended for individual use and thus 
presenting a lower risk, or as a ‘dealing stash’ intended for distribution 
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and so presenting a higher risk. 
 
A study by Havis et al. of 43 drug-related deaths in police custody in 
England and Wales between 1997 and 2002 found that 16 were due to 
internal drug concealment.22 In eight of these 16 cases, the deceased 
were known, or believed, to have concealed drugs by swallowing them 
at the point of initial contact with the police. This study identified that 
there were delays in identifying deterioration, variable implementation 
of resuscitation and that the time taken for the Forensic Medical 
Examiner to attend varied. The police force adopt a ‘safety first 
approach’ and usually transport those arrested after ‘stuffing’ to 
hospital without delay. 
 
A further two studies on Body-Stuffers are by Jordan and Moriera, as 
referenced.23 Although of less relevance to a UK population as 
methamphetamine is less commonly seen, an additional study by West 
dealing with methamphetamine body stuffers is also referenced.24
 
 
Vulnerable groups 
 
A future analysis of the demographics of the SIDT population over the 
last five years would allow for the appropriate development of 
detailed, specific guidance for categories of vulnerability. As this data 
was not available to the group, we cite vulnerable groups in terms of 
differing characteristics with regard to physiology, pathology or mental 
capacity. Groups that may be vulnerable or require special 
consideration include:  
 
• Those lacking capacity, such as individuals with learning 
disabilities; 
 
• Individuals with mental health problems; 
 
• Children and young people;  
 
• Those with significant pre-existing illness; and 
 
• Pregnant women (A healthcare professional should offer women 
of childbearing age a pregnancy test and determine whether the 
woman should be referred for assessment in hospital.  If a 
woman implies that she could be pregnant, this should be 
accepted to be true until proven otherwise and any decision to 
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refuse further investigations should be respected. No imaging 
tests should be undertaken without medical advice).  
 
Whilst the group understood that SIDTs are not characteristically older 
people or the very young, development of specific guidance will 
necessitate a more extensive analysis of the particular vulnerable 
subpopulation of SIDTs and recorded experiences of the custodial 
pathway followed by such individuals. With this understanding, 
appropriate advice can be given with regard to the monitoring of such 
individuals, the location of their custody and care, and any specific 
requirements they may require. The development of specific pathways 
of care appropriate to their needs are advised as part of the overall 
development of protocols for the management of SIDTs.  
 
The Expert Group recommends that UKBA should commission, with 
advice from Medical Royal Colleges and the UK Departments of Health, 
the development of detailed clinical pathways and standardised 
national protocols for the healthcare of SIDTs in custody. This should 
help to address current variability in the arrangements for the care 
and monitoring of SIDTs and improve the quality and continuity of 
their care. 
 
 
4.2 - Initial Investigations 
 
 
 
It should be noted that consent must be sought from SIDTs for any 
examination, medical investigations (including low dose scanners), or 
procedure in accordance with GMC guidance.25 Should a detainee 
refuse to provide their consent for any proposed assessment or 
treatment, they are entitled to do so. This would have to be recorded 
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by the FP following an assessment to ensure that they had the 
appropriate capacity to make this decision. Guidance relating to the 
issues of consent and capacity is provided in Chapter 4. 
 
 
Toxicological investigations 
 
A FP, and hospital medical staff if the SIDT is in hospital, will advise on 
the appropriateness and timing of any investigations during the 
pathway of care, including an accurate urine test for drugs of abuse. A 
urine screen that is positive for one or more drugs of abuse suggests 
that either the patient has used the drug in the previous few days, or 
at least one packet is leaking. It should be noted that a positive screen 
can also arise because of surface contamination of packages. A 
negative screen strongly suggests that no packet is leaking. Screens 
should be performed immediately if the patient develops features of 
intoxication, or otherwise on a daily basis to confirm the diagnosis. 
However, the priority in those who develop intoxication is clinical 
management and stabilisation and a drug screen should not delay their 
management. 
 
While a negative drug test is helpful, a positive test should be 
interpreted with caution as it does not necessarily indicate package 
rupture or that the patient is at higher risk. 
 
 
Radiological Investigations 
 
At the beginning of the custodial pathway, an individual suspected of 
smuggling drugs internally may be asked to consent to a scan using 
low-dose X-ray technology.  
 
The advent of low-dose ‘body scanners’ has changed the investigation 
pathway, substantially increasing the use of imaging in drug package 
detection. These machines can be situated in an airport terminal or 
other appropriate location, do not require the transfer of the subject to 
a hospital X-ray department, and use a much lower radiation dose 
than is involved in conventional radiography, typically 0.25 – 3 
microsieverts. Nevertheless, all such exposures are subject to Ionising 
Radiation (Medical Exposure) Regulations 2000 (IR(ME)R), including: 
 
(i) The need for all such exposures to be justified and 
optimized; 
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(ii) The need for written protocols and procedures 
governing the use of such equipment; 
 
(iii) The need in particular for a written policy defining the 
range of circumstances under which an individual is 
scanned and the place of this test within the overall 
detection process. For example, to consider what, if 
any, other tests should be performed and the results 
available before scanning; 
 
(iv) Referral to be made by a registered health professional; 
 
(v) Entitlement of the operators with a defined scope of 
practice by the employer; 
 
(vi) Appropriate training for operators; 
 
(vii) Clear definition of responsibility for clinical evaluation of 
the images; 
 
(viii) The retention of records of the exposures and of their 
clinical evaluation; 
 
(ix) The appointment of a Medical Physics Expert as well as 
the Radiation Protection Adviser appointed under 
Ionising Radiation Regulations 1999 (IRR99).26  
 
The accuracy of low dose body scanners for drug package detection is 
currently unknown and, to the Expert Group’s knowledge, no direct 
comparison between this technique and conventional radiography has 
been performed. False positive tests are known to occur, usually in 
individuals with constipation, but no data are available with regard to 
their frequency. The false negative rate is also unknown. 
 
As a result of the direct observations and discussions of current 
practice in the use of low dose body scanners in non-hospital settings, 
the Expert Group recommends that UKBA should review compliance 
with Ionising Radiation regulations, particularly with respect to the use 
of low dose body scanners and other equipment used outside health 
care settings. 
 
The IR(ME)R regulations require that a referral for imaging comes 
from a registered health professional. The way in which this 
requirement is met in the environment in which UKBA officers are 
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working needs to be clarified. One option may be that a senior medical 
officer could be approached to agree a list of criteria against which the 
UKBA official might assess an individual's suitability for imaging. In 
essence, the medical officer would be delegating the task of referral to 
the UKBA officer but would need to be confident of the officer’s 
competence to carry out that task; the medical officer would retain 
responsibility in law for the referral. This potential solution could be 
discussed with the relevant IR(ME)R Inspectorates in England and the 
devolved administrations.27 
 
 
4.3 – Transport of Detainees 
 
 
 
As has already been outlined, SIDTs are physically transported from 
one setting to another at different stages of the custodial pathway; for 
example, from the point of apprehension to the custody suite. A 
number of recommendations are of relevance to this. 
Recommendations 3 and 4 address the development of detailed clinical 
pathways and the need to ensure that custodial staff, including those 
accompanying SIDTs in transport, are appropriately trained and able 
to apply a custodial early warning score, as detailed in the following 
section. As detailed in the previous chapter, UKBA officials do not 
routinely seek the advice of a FP prior to the transfer of a detainee, 
and this might be reviewed as part of the development of the 
pathways. 
 
A latter recommendation, Recommendation 9, addresses the options 
for reducing the number of occasions on which a SIDT is in transit 
between locations. Whilst geographical co-location of different stages 
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of the pathway would be challenging, UKBA may wish to consider 
whether it is possible to do so.  
 
 
4.4 – Detention in a UKBA Custody Suite 
 
 
Modified Early Warning Score Systems 
 
The use of early warning systems is now widespread in clinical care, 
with Modified Early Warning Score (MEWS), or Patient at Risk, 
processes adopted widely in Emergency Departments in the UK.28  
MEWS is a form of track and trigger scoring system that is based on 
routine observations. It has been demonstrated to be an effective 
triage tool in the acute setting, with higher admission MEWS 
correlating with increased risk of death, CCU/ICU admission to a 
critical care or intensive care unit, and longer hospital stays 
independent of patient age.  
 
Early warning scoring systems were originally developed with two 
specific aims: to facilitate timely recognition of patients with 
established or impending critical illness; and to empower nurses and 
junior medical staff to secure experienced help through the operation 
of a trigger threshold which, if reached, required mandatory 
attendance by a more senior member of staff.29 The MEWS score can 
detect subtle changes in physiology, which will be reflected in a 
change of score should the patient’s condition improve or deteriorate. 
MEWS is supported by the Royal College of Surgeons and the 
Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and Ireland, and was a 
recommendation of a recent National Confidential Enquiry into Patient 
Outcome and Death (2005) study and report. The Resuscitation 
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Council UK also published guidelines and recommendations in 2010 
that included reference to EWS, and EWS are mentioned in the Audit 
Commission Report of 1999.30  
 
MEWS is based on data derived from four physiological readings 
(systolic blood pressure, heart rate, respiratory rate and body 
temperature), and one observation (level of consciousness). The 
resulting observations are compared to a normal range to generate a 
single score. A score of five or more is clearly linked to increased 
likelihood of death and admission to an intensive care unit.31 Analysis 
of the critical events preceding a number of adult cardiac arrests 
demonstrates significant antecedents, usually related to abnormalities 
of the airway, breathing, and circulation.32   
 
MEWS processes allow an evidence-based risk stratification of patients 
and also the anticipation of possible deterioration of patients.33 Heart 
rate, respiratory rate and oxygen saturation readings have been 
shown to be able to detect early deterioration.34 An improvement in 
serial MEWS within four hours of presentation to hospital predicts 
improved clinical outcomes.35 However, MEWS is not a comprehensive 
clinical assessment tool or a replacement for clinical judgment and is 
validated only for adult patients. The MEWS/observation of physical 
signs should be undertaken regularly and documented on a 
standardised patient observation chart. 
 
A Custodial Early Warning System (CEWS) could be developed as an 
adaptation of MEWS, with incorporation of the RCUK recommendations 
to the custodial environment utilising those validated measurements to 
assist custody staff in making appropriate and timely judgments. 
Additional parameters might be included to encompass the different 
environment and presentations that relate to custody. A CEWS could, 
for example, rely on the regular monitoring and recording of blood 
pressure, pulse, temperature, AVPU scale for the assessment of 
consciousness - as an appropriate substitute for the Glasgow Coma 
Score (GCS), and respiratory rate. Physical examination is the most 
important component as any deterioration warrants immediate 
hospital attention. Hospital staff could be provided with a CEWS 
proforma, as the usual hospital monitoring processes may not identify 
drug intoxication. 
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The Detention of SIDTs in Custody 
 
The Expert Group recommends that the development of detailed 
clinical pathways and standardised national protocols for the 
healthcare of SIDTs in custody should include a modified version of an 
early warning system for the custodial environment, a Custodial Early 
Warning System (CEWS) as described above, and that Body-Packers 
should be only detained in custody if constant observation with CEWS 
scoring can be provided and any observed changes acted upon 
immediately. A fuller Modified Early Warning System (MEWS) should 
be used in health care settings where a wider range of physiological 
variables can be monitored by healthcare staff. 
 
The Expert Group concluded that Body-Packers in particular should  
only be detained in custody if: 
 
(i) Twenty-four hour observation with a modified early 
warning system (CEWS) can be provided and any 
observed changes acted upon immediately; 
 
(ii) There is rapid access to an emergency department with 
24/7 acute surgical facilities; 
 
(iii) Custody staff are suitably trained (healthcare 
Professionals should hold an Immediate Life Support 
certificate); and 
 
(iv) All necessary emergency drugs and equipment are 
provided and staff are fully trained to use the 
equipment and to administer these drugs. 
 
If these facilities and trained staff are not available twenty-four hours 
a day seven days a week, Body-Packers should be referred 
immediately to an emergency department with acute surgical facilities 
available, as this group of SIDTs are at particularly high risk. As Body-
Packers who have not passed drug packets by the fifth day following 
ingestion are at a higher risk of intestinal obstruction, they should be 
referred for hospital assessment at this time. Finally, in the 
development of clinical pathways, consideration should be given to the 
circumstances that give rise to the assessment of SIDTs. At present 
this is dependent upon the condition of the individual, but thought 
could be given as to whether it is necessary for all SIDTs, regardless of 
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their presenting condition, to be assessed by a FP. 
 
 
4.5 - Management of SIDTs while in UKBA Custody in a Hospital 
 
 
In developing pathways of care in custody, UKBA and the Royal 
College of Physicians’ Faculty of Forensic and Legal Medicine should 
take account of the specific investigations and interventions that can 
only take place within the setting of a hospital. Whilst the following 
detail does not represent a comprehensive guideline for the care of 
SIDTs in a hospital setting, it reflects some of the considerations for 
their care and management that would need to be made.   
 
 
Radiological investigations 
 
The role of imaging is confined to Body-Packers as it has a limited role 
in the care of Body-Stuffers and Pushers. Imaging is used for two 
distinct purposes in the care of suspected Body-Packers: The 
investigation of suspected complications of drug concealment in a 
symptomatic individual, and the detection of drug packages in an 
asymptomatic individual. When used in the context of a patient with 
abdominal symptoms due to obstruction, the imaging pathway will be 
the same as for any other patient with suspected bowel obstruction, 
perforation or other abdominal catastrophe. The principal techniques 
used will be plain radiography of the chest and abdomen, ultrasound 
and computed tomography (CT) scanning. 
 
The use of radiographic imaging for purposes of detection of drug 
packages in an asymptomatic individual constitutes a medico-legal 
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radiation exposure and is subject to the IR(ME)R regulations, as 
outlined earlier in the chapter. Such an exposure may only be carried 
out with the consent of the subject and should be avoided in pregnant 
women. In addition, abdominal X-ray should be avoided in the second 
half of the menstrual cycle if there is a possibility that a woman could 
be pregnant.    
 
The accuracy of different radiographic techniques for drug package 
detection has been investigated and factors that have been shown to 
influence the likelihood of detection include: 
 
(i) The number and size of the packages; 
 
(ii) The package density; 
 
(iii) The position of the packages; 
 
(iv) The time of ingestion relative to time of radiography; 
 
(v) The body habitus of the subject; and 
 
(vi) The degree of suspicion by the observer. 
 
 
Reports of the sensitivity of plain radiography vary from 47-90%.36 
One difficulty is that the false negative rate cannot be established as 
an asymptomatic individual with a reported negative radiograph is 
usually discharged without follow-up.  
 
The role of ultrasound remains unclear. It has been reported to be of 
similar accuracy to abdominal X-ray and to be far less accurate than 
CT.37 CT is very accurate with detection rates of 96%, but has rarely 
been employed in asymptomatic individuals due to the higher radiation 
dose involved.38 Recent studies on CT by Yang and Sengupta have 
been considered.39 At present CT should be reserved for serious and 
life-threatening conditions such as bowel obstruction, because of the 
high radiation dose involved, but the future development of low dose 
CT techniques may cause this view to be revised.   
 
 
Removal of packages in Body-Packers and Body-Stuffers 
 
In the past, early surgery was advocated in Body-Packers once the 
diagnosis became apparent. However, with the development of 
 26
improved packaging, a more conservative management approach can 
now be adopted, unless symptoms develop. Literature shows that 
there is a complication rate of less than 5% with this more 
conservative approach.40  
 
Immediate surgery is indicated if acute intestinal obstruction develops, 
or when packets can be seen radiologically and there is radiological, 
clinical or analytical evidence to suggest leakage - particularly if the 
drug involved is a central nervous system stimulant, such as cocaine.41 
In this situation, the clinical consequences of poisoning are more 
serious and management is more difficult than for opioids (for which 
an infusion of an opiate antagonist) or cannabis. A high rate (40%) of 
postoperative wound infection has been found, which was correlated 
with the number of enterotomies.42 It is recommended that 
investigations be performed postoperatively to discount the possibility 
of missed packages.43  
 
Packets that remain in the stomach may be retrieved by endoscopy 
and by inducing emesis, but these are potentially dangerous 
procedures and are best avoided.44 Optimal management of patients 
with packets in the small bowel is uncertain and conservative 
strategies have their advocates.45 If there is no clinical, analytical or 
radiological evidence to support leakage, the use of sorbitol or 
lactulose, with or without bowel stimulants (for example, Bisacodyl) to 
encourage transit through the gut, is successful in many cases. 
Alternatively and, for faster results, whole-bowel irrigation using 
polyethylene glycol electrolyte solutions can be used.46 Liquid paraffin 
should not be used because it can weaken rubber, leading to bursting 
of the packets. Activated charcoal has been advocated by some, but 
induces constipation when used in substantial doses to surround a 
large number of packages, and is therefore contraindicated. It may be 
useful in individuals with package rupture whilst stabilising for surgery.  
 
Packets in the colon or rectum are probably best managed by giving 
Sorbitol or Lactulose and allowing them to pass spontaneously, with 
least risk of rupture. Packets in the vagina can usually be removed 
manually and with ease. 
 
In Body-Stuffers, packets in the vagina and/or rectum can usually be 
removed manually. 
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Recommendations 
 
1. UKBA and healthcare professionals should use agreed and 
consistent language and terminology, pertaining to specific methods of 
smuggling, when referring to the population denoted as SIDTs.  
 
2. UKBA should review compliance with Ionising Radiation regulations, 
particularly with respect to the use of low dose body scanners and 
other equipment used outside health care settings. 
 
3. UKBA should commission, with advice from Medical Royal Colleges 
and the UK Departments of Health, the development of detailed clinical 
pathways and standardised national protocols for the healthcare of 
SIDTs in custody. These pathways should include a Custodial Early 
Warning System (CEWS) for use in the custodial environment, and 
conventional Modified Early Warning System (MEWS) for use in health 
care environments; guidance on rapid access referral for transfer of 
SIDTs to appropriate receiving hospitals/provider units; and detail 
specific circumstances when medical or other healthcare professional 
advice should be sought. Attention should also be given to the care of 
SIDTs with mental health issues or impaired capacity, women who 
may be pregnant, minors and other vulnerable individuals.  
 
Future decisions regarding the commissioning of health services 
relating to individuals in UKBA custody will be assisted by the 
development of such clinical pathways and protocols.   
 
4. Body-Packers should be only detained in custody if constant 
observation with CEWS scoring can be provided and any observed 
changes acted upon immediately. There must be available rapid access 
to an emergency department with acute surgical facilities and all 
necessary emergency drugs and equipment available twenty-four 
hours, seven days a week. Staff should be fully trained to use both the 
equipment and to administer these drugs. If these facilities and trained 
staff are not available, Body-Packers must be referred immediately to 
an emergency department with acute surgical facilities available 
twenty-four hours, seven days a week. 
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Chapter 3: UK Border Agency: Environment, Staffing and 
Resources 
 
 
 
UKBA informed the group that the majority of Body-Packers arrested 
in London are held in the detention unit at Colnbrook, which has 
extensive CCTV and provision for the twenty-four hour supervision of 
the detainees. However, several problems exist with the detention 
centre, with the first of these being that a patient trolley cannot be 
accommodated in the lift. As the unit is on the third floor, this impedes 
the rapid transfer of a moribund patient and means that any ongoing 
resuscitation would have to cease during transfer. There is also limited 
medical equipment available and Health Care Professionals (HCPs) are 
not based on site.  
 
Detainees suffering a cardiac arrest due to internal concealment of 
illegal drugs are likely to require more advanced medical intervention 
such as intubation, drugs or surgical intervention and the detention 
centre is a substantial distance from the nearest emergency 
department (Hillingdon Hospital) with the journey taking about twenty 
minutes at best. Basic Life Support is not a current requirement for 
UKBA Custody Officers and while medical staff are available in a 
neighbouring immigration suite, their level of training is undetermined.  
 
Using Colnbrook as an example, this chapter makes recommendations 
on the appropriate facilities and equipment that should be made 
available in all UKBA custody suites. The chapter also addresses the 
training of UKBA staff, both permanent and contracted, and considers 
the monitoring of detainees whilst in custody.   
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Investigating Officers suite at Heathrow 
 
The custody facilities at Heathrow and Manchester include in-cell CCTV 
allowing twenty-four hour remote detainee monitoring of detainees, 
something that is also available at Dover, and special toilet facilities 
that allow for the hygienic recovery of packages. These facilities are 
also available at Gatwick, which is used as an auxiliary custody suite. 
A full list of the facilities available at Colnbrook includes:  
 
• A video surveillance room; 
 
• Twenty detention cells, four with en-suite facilities for detainees 
other than SIDTs; 
  
• A specialised toilet unit in the detention cells for recovery of 
samples for testing;  
 
• Facilities for less able bodied detainees  
 
• EMIT room for Enzyme Multiplied Immuno-Assay Test; and 
 
• Two fridges with chemicals and storage space for DNA samples. 
 
• Exercise yard 
 
 
When visited in 2010, the Investigating Officer’s suite at Colnbrook 
included a room for a FP with a desk, basic medical equipment and an 
examination couch. Whilst the FP provides necessary medical 
equipment, usually bringing a doctor’s bag, other equipment included: 
 
• An Automated External Defibrillator; 
 
• Drugs, including: analgesic and non-steroidal anti-inflamatory 
agents (Dihydrocodeine, Diclofenac, Mefenamic acid); a minor 
tranquilliser (Diazepam); an anti-anginal agent (Glyceryl 
trinitrate); a proton pump inhibitor (Omeprazole); a hypnotic 
(Temazepam); an antibiotic (Amoxycillin) an antihistamine 
(chlorpheniramine); nicotine patches; laxatives (Lactulose), and 
suppositories. 
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If a detainee requires medication for any existing medical problem, the 
FP will provide a prescription. It is the responsibility of the detention 
staff to obtain the prescribed medication in a timely way.  
 
The Expert Group recommends that a standard list of medical 
equipment and medication should be provided in custody suites where 
SIDT are held. The medication and equipment provided (including 
automatic defibrillators) should be in stock, in date, and serviced 
according to the manufacturer’s specification. 
 
 
Training for UKBA Staff 
 
SIDTs are held in custody in a number of differing environments 
supported by a variable mix of permanent and contracted staff with 
varying levels of experience. On the evidence provided by UKBA and 
HMRC, the training for each staff group differs.  
 
 
Training of UKBA Custody Officers 
 
UKBA Custody Officers carry out procedures in line with the PACE Act 
regarding any detainee. The Custody Officer is the person in charge of 
the custody suite and is trained and designated as such under section 
36 of PACE. Induction for new Custody Officers is not formal, but 
rather they will spend some time being mentored and working with an 
experienced colleague.  UKBA custody officers are not trained in first 
aid. 
 
UKBA provides training for Custody Officers, which includes: 
 
• UKBA Custody Duty of Care - This package highlights the duty of 
care the Custody Officer has towards detainees; 
 
• UKBA Custody Medical Care - This package is designed to enable 
the Custody Officer to understand the importance of medical 
care in detention; 
 
• UKBA Secondary Examination Area Training Internal 
Concealments - This package identifies the indicators associated 
with internal concealments and the procedures to be followed in 
dealing with a passenger suspected of carrying drugs internally; 
and 
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• UKBA Custody Special Groups - This package covers the correct 
way of dealing with Special Groups. For example, juveniles; 
mentally disordered or mentally vulnerable persons; illiterate 
persons; blind or deaf persons; and non-English speaking 
persons. 
 
 
Training of UKBA Contracted Staff 
 
Training and induction arrangements for UKBA contractors at present 
include: 
 
• The legal framework including documentation; 
 
• First Aid to approved standards/control and care of the 
prisoner/detainee; 
 
• Identification of, and procedures for dealing with, vulnerable 
detainees; 
 
• Security procedures for dealing with vulnerable detainees; 
 
• Control and restraint procedures, including awareness on the use 
of handcuffs; 
 
• Escorting procedures; 
 
• Suicide awareness; 
 
• Record keeping, including witness statements and 
custody/remand entries; 
 
• Health and safety; 
 
• The searching of detainees, rooms and vehicles; 
 
• Giving evidence in court; and 
 
• Food hygiene. 
 
 
UKBA contractor SERCO have informed UKBA that all current Custody 
Support Officers will undergo refresher training at intervals of no more 
than two years, with some aspects being delivered on an annual basis. 
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The refresher training will comprise a minimum of two days for control 
and restraint, three to four days for first aid and four days for general 
custody training.   
 
Where similar circumstances pertain in other parts of the country, 
UKBA contractor staff are not used. In such circumstances, customs 
officials take on this role (as they did at Heathrow before UKBA 
contractors undertook this). 
 
The lack of permanent staff with consistent and detailed training in 
custodial issues was of concern to the Expert Group, as was the quality 
of training provided and the ability of staff to identify deterioration in 
the condition of detainees. 
  
It is therefore recommended that appropriate training for custody 
staff, both permanent and contracted, should be introduced as a part 
of the standardised national protocols for the care of SIDTs outlined in 
Recommendation 1. This should include the use of CEWS, and be 
introduced to allow for the identification of individuals at high risk, the 
adequate monitoring of detainees, and the early identification of signs 
of toxicity. UKBA should also ensure that staff are competent in 
recognising signs of drug intoxication, including acute cocaine toxicity, 
as well as understanding the requirements of duty of care. All custodial 
staff (permanent and contracted) should be trained in Basic Life 
Support, recognition of the signs and symptoms of drug intoxication 
and other common clinical conditions. Finally, a protocol should be 
developed which defines the circumstances when custody staff should 
seek advice from a FP. 
 
 
Current arrangements for Monitoring SIDTs in UKBA Custody  
 
UKBA contractors (SERCO since 2005) provide staff to act as jailers. 
These individuals are selected from a cohort with a low turnover of 
personnel and are trained by the UKBA contractor according to a 
template provided by HM Customs and Excise (HMCE), which 
originates from when the initial system was designed. The staff 
observe detainees by viewing live video relayed from custody cells, 
with all video recorded and held for 30 days. The Custody Officer will 
review the videotape or visit the detainee in their cell to investigate, 
should they exhibit signs, or behaviour, of concern. 
 
Procedure documents for staff which were supplied to the group by 
UKBA, recommend observation for signs such as dilated pupils and 
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sweating. While the video may allow assessment of unusual behaviour 
or restlessness, other physical signs of drug intoxication such as 
dilated pupils and/or increased sweating would not be evident. The 
documents refer to ‘irregular behaviour’, which was described on the 
visit to Colnbrook to include evidence of suspicious movement under 
blankets, efforts by detainees to reach underneath their clothing and 
attempts to covertly pass packages. If such behaviour were witnessed 
on video surveillance, HCPs and an ambulance would be called, 
depending on the custodial staff’s assessment of the urgency of 
situation.  
 
 
Enhancing Current Monitoring and Surveillance 
 
One option for improving the observation of SIDTs in UKBA custody 
would be to refer all such cases to a hospital unit for assessment, 
something that would represent a significant change to current 
arrangements. An alternative would be the development of a small 
number of specialist units attached to hospitals, incorporating 
arrangements for temporary custody and the medical observation of 
SIDTs. This represents the safest option for medical care in 
concentrating specialist facilities and expertise, but would require 
significant change to current arrangements, including the creation of 
such facilities with a co-located (temporary) custodial environment.  
 
As recommended in the preceding chapter, the Expert Group suggest 
that a Custodial Early Warning system would provide a more 
formalised and clinically orientated observation process, which should 
be undertaken by adequately trained and fully resourced UKBA staff 
and contracted health professionals in current settings. This 
recommendation should be implemented as soon as possible to 
identify circumstances in which SIDTs should be  transferred 
immediately to hospital whilst the other two policy options described 
above are considered.  
 
 
Ensuring the Safety of UKBA Staff 
 
The employer’s duty of care is broad and extends to both those being 
detained and those caring for detainees. The health and safety of both 
is laid out in legislation and associated Codes of Practice and guidance. 
The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 are 
especially relevant as these describe the duty to assess and control 
risk.47  
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In relation to detainees, employees face four groups of health risks: 
 
• Violence (from aggressive detainees); 
 
• Mental pressure; 
 
• Infection risks arising from countries of origin; and 
 
• Infections risks arising from contact with body fluids. 
 
 
Officials are trained in managing aggressive detainees and to deal with 
the mental pressures associated with their work.  
 
Support should be in place for officials to promote and maintain their 
psychological wellbeing. This support should conform to the 
recommendations in the recent NICE Guidance on Promoting Mental 
Wellbeing in the Workplace.48 An important component of this is to 
make sure that employees are aware of, and have access to, support 
in response to stressful incidents in the workplace. 
 
The infection risks arising from contact with international travellers are 
usually small and are not unique to contact with SIDTs. An exception 
is tuberculosis, which is a recognised risk in detention facilities and is a 
disease that is relatively common in travellers from some areas. The 
main infection risks arise from potential contact with enteric agents (in 
the handling of materials contaminated with faeces), and from 
potential agents associated with blood-borne diseases. Detainees may 
be drug users, and inadvertent exposure to blood or bodily fluids may 
place the staff at risk. As such, a protocol for post exposure 
prophylaxis (hepatitis and HIV) should be in place for staff. 
 
Good hygiene measures, including the use of personal protective 
equipment, prevent enteric diseases. Similar measures minimise the 
likelihood of infection by blood borne viruses. Where an employee is 
directly exposed to body fluids, for example from a bite, scratch, 
contaminated sharp, or body fluid splash on a mucous membrane, 
urgent advice should be sought from a specialist in occupational 
medicine, microbiology, or emergency medicine. It is important that 
staff are familiar with the local procedures for dealing with body fluid 
exposure. Those caring for detainees should be immunised against 
hepatitis B and tuberculosis. 
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Forensic physicians with differing experience of SIDTs 
 
FPs working in different settings and geographical locations in the 
country have different experience of SIDTs. Some will frequently 
encounter such individuals and others less frequently. In order to 
assure a common level of essential knowledge and skill for FPs working 
in this area the Expert Group recommend that the Royal College of 
Physicians, through the Faculty of Forensic and Legal Medicine, 
develop a postgraduate education programme for FPs, covering the 
medical care of SIDTs in custody. This should be considered as a 
mandatory element of Continuing Professional Development for those 
in the specialty working in environments where SIDTs may be 
encountered. This is in order to ensure that FPs working in different 
settings have a common level of essential knowledge and skill. 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
5. A standard list of medical equipment and medication should be 
provided in custody suites where SIDT are held. The medication and 
equipment provided (including automatic defibrillators) should be in 
stock, in date, and serviced according to the manufacturer’s 
specification. 
 
6. Appropriate training for custody staff, both permanent and 
contracted, should be introduced as a part of the standardised national 
protocols for the care of SIDTs in Recommendation 3. This should 
include the use of CEWS, and be introduced to allow the identification 
of individuals at high risk, the adequate monitoring of detainees, and 
the early identification of signs of toxicity. 
 
7. UKBA should ensure that staff are competent in recognising signs of 
drug intoxication, including acute cocaine toxicity, as well as 
understanding the requirements of duty of care. All custodial staff 
(permanent and contracted) should be trained in Basic Life Support, 
recognition of the signs and symptoms of drug intoxication and other 
common clinical conditions. 
 
8. All Health Care Professionals working in UKBA environments should 
ensure that they hold a current Immediate Life Support (ILS) 
certificate with additional training in the recognition and management 
of conditions presenting in custody. 
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9. Consideration should be given to the feasibility of developing a 
small number of specialist units attached to hospitals, which 
incorporate arrangements for temporary custody and the medical 
observation of SIDTs. This represents the safest option in that it would 
concentrate specialist facilities and expertise in a few sites, but would 
require significant change to the current distributed arrangements, 
including a co-located (temporary) custodial environment. 
 
10. The Royal College of Physicians, through the Faculty of Forensic 
and Legal Medicine, should develop a postgraduate education 
programme for FPs, covering the medical care of SIDTs in custody. 
This should be considered as a mandatory element of Continuing 
Professional Development for those in the specialty working in 
environments where SIDTs may be encountered in order to ensure 
that FPs working in different settings have a common level of essential 
knowledge and skill. 
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Chapter 4: Ethical Considerations  
 
People who are identified and detained by UKBA as SIDTs are a mixed 
population. UKBA note that the SIDT population includes individuals 
acting as ‘professional couriers’ who are fully cognisant of the potential 
implications of their actions, and who conceal drugs internally, 
sometimes on repeated occasions. However, some SIDTs may be 
vulnerable, falling into those groups defined in chapter 2. Some may 
have been subjected to coercion or other pressures, and there may be 
a perceived risk to their own safety as well as that of their families if 
they admit to carrying packages of drugs. Such individuals often have 
no understanding of the legal and health system in the UK and may 
fear the consequences of any admission of information. SIDTs may not 
have English as a first language, or even speak it at all. Even where 
English is spoken or understood, illiteracy may affect the person’s 
ability to understand the process. In view of these factors, the initial 
management of such individuals is crucial and their welfare should be 
the primary concern of all those who come into contact with them in a 
professional capacity, informed by current national guidance.49  
 
Some general principles apply: 
 
• SIDT in UKBA custody are entitled to receive the same standard 
of health care as any other patient; 
  
• Those providing treatment and care must be aware of the 
obligation to respect the person’s human rights (for example, 
right to life (Article 2), right to private and family life (Article 8), 
and be conscious of how these rights can be compromised;50 
 
• When undertaking assessments of SIDTs, providing advice and 
undertaking investigations or treatment, doctors and other 
healthcare professionals are subject to the same ethical and 
professional standards as they are for all other patient groups. 
All healthcare professionals must follow the standards set by the 
professional regulators (for example, The General Medical 
Council, The Nursing and Midwifery Council), including in relation 
to consent and confidentiality;51  
  
• Healthcare professionals responsible for providing care to SIDTs 
must recognise and work within the limits of their competence 
and keep their knowledge and skills up to date. 
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The following paragraphs set out how these principles apply in relation 
to a range of relevant factors, including access to information, meeting 
language and communication needs, obtaining consent, and respecting 
confidentiality.  
 
Access to Information 
 
Detainees must have access to information concerning their rights and 
entitlements in a format and language that they understand, as well as 
access to legal and medical advice and care. Detainees in UKBA 
custody should be given information in a way that they can understand 
as early as possible about: 
 
• Any medical assessments or procedures that they will be asked 
to undertake (for example, X-rays, CT scans), the purpose of 
these and what they will involve; 
 
• The roles and responsibilities of those undertaking any clinical 
investigations or procedures or providing medical advice, care or 
treatment;  
 
• Their right to confidentiality and any limits on this; 
 
• How medical care will be provided and decisions made about 
their care. For example, whether they need to go to hospital; 
 
• The health risks of concealing drugs internally and what can be 
done to minimise these risks (for example, taking food and 
water);  
 
• The right to refuse to agree to undertake any investigation or 
treatment, and any consequences of such a refusal. 
 
 
Language, advocacy and communication  
 
As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, literacy problems may 
affect detainees’ ability to understand the process into which they 
enter. The importance of communicating information in a way that 
people can understand is crucial.  
 
This may require information to be given to people in different formats 
and indicates that the need for access to interpretative and 
communication support might need to be reconsidered. Arrangements 
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surrounding provision of information and the identification of the need 
for an independent advocate should be reviewed. Where a detainee is 
perceived to be vulnerable in any way, PACE Code C requires the 
provision of an ‘appropriate adult’ who will fulfill this independent 
advocacy role. Language translation should be provided in an 
independent manner. 
 
The provision of a standardised leaflet to all detainees, made available 
in several languages and describing the custodial process, the law in 
the UK, medical risk and possible interventions, is advised. 
 
 
Confidentiality 
 
All detainees have a right to confidentiality, but it is not an absolute 
right. Doctors and other healthcare professionals owe a legal duty of 
confidentiality to their patients. 
 
The detainee should be informed about how information about them 
(including information they disclose to a UKBA official, nurse, FP or 
hospital doctor) will be used, to whom it may be disclosed to and for 
what purpose, and of any right they have to object. 
 
 
Consent  
 
Key principles regarding consent include:  
 
• Respect for the individual’s right to determine what happens to 
their own body (autonomy) is a fundamental principle of good 
practice; 
 
• Valid consent requires the individual patient to be competent, 
informed and not under duress; 
 
• Adults should be assumed to have capacity to consent to a 
proposed investigation or treatment; 
 
• A competent adult has the right to refuse any investigation and 
treatment and cannot be treated against their will unless they 
require compulsory treatment for a mental disorder (under the 
relevant mental health legislation in the UK). 
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Individuals should understand that they can change their mind about 
consenting to a course of investigation and treatment. Difficulties may 
be encountered in ensuring that decisions are voluntary, a full 
exploration of the issues and guidance is provided by the General 
Medical Council. 
  
Capacity 
 
Where there is doubt about an individual’s capacity, an appropriate 
assessment of capacity should be carried out by the Forensic Physician 
in the first instance. Where someone is assessed to lack capacity to 
make a particular decision, decisions must be made in accordance with 
the law (Mental Capacity Act, Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 
and the common law in Northern Ireland.)52 
 
Key issues in considering capacity are that: 
 
• Capacity is decision specific (i.e. the person must have the 
capacity to make the particular decision at the particular time);  
 
• A person must be assumed to have capacity unless proven 
otherwise; 
 
• Where there is doubt, capacity must be properly assessed; 
 
• If a person is assessed to lack capacity, they must be treated in 
accordance with the law (see above); and  
 
• Capacity must be monitored in situations where it may be 
fluctuating. 
 
Detainees who lack capacity can be treated in their ‘best interests’, 
under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 in England and Wales and the 
common law in Northern Ireland, or for their ‘overall benefit’ under the 
Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000.53 Decisions made in a 
patient’s best interests or overall benefit should take account of that 
patient’s own likely wishes. Patients cannot be given treatment for 
which they have made a valid advance refusal, unless it is compulsory 
treatment given under mental health legislation.  
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Treatment for a mental disorder 
 
The Mental Health Act 1983, as amended, in England and Wales 
specifically excludes compulsory treatment in prison, as does the 
Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 and the 
Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986.54 If a detainee is 
suspected to have a mental disorder requiring treatment, they should be 
transferred out of the prison or detention setting as soon as possible and 
transferred to an appropriate setting for assessment and treatment. 
 
Raising concerns 
 
All healthcare professionals have a duty to raise concerns if they feel 
that patient safety is at risk for whatever reason, and the GMC and 
Nursing and Midwifery Council have issued guidance on this matter.55 
Initially, the healthcare professional should raise the matter with the 
appropriate person in the employing or contracting body, and the 
organisation’s policy and procedure for raising concerns should be 
followed.56 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
11. UKBA should review current information supplied to detainees and 
arrangements for independent advocacy and respect for human rights. 
 
By reviewing current arrangements, UKBA should ensure that an 
independent advocate is made available to detainees according to 
need and that information given to detainees covers the medical and 
legal aspects of detention, and is presented in an easily 
understandable format. All custodial and healthcare staff must be 
aware of the obligation to respect the person’s human rights and be 
conscious of how these rights can be compromised. 
  
12. Forensic physicians independently retained by UKBA must be 
contracted as self-employed individuals. This is in order to ensure the 
provision of independent and objective advice to UKBA, so that FPs 
may fulfil their duty of care to SIDTs in custody. A confidential 
consultation between the FP and SIDT in custody, in addition to the 
attendance of an FP that is required before an individual can be 
charged, will support this. Similar provisions could be considered for all 
HCPs providing care in custodial situations with regard to their 
employment status and professional standards of practice.  
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Conclusion & Summary of Recommendations 
 
The recommendations contained in this guidance should prove helpful 
to UKBA in developing an equitable strategy for the detention and care 
of SIDTs, which assures the safety of the clinical care provided to them 
and that the correct jurisdictional process is followed. 
 
Through the course of its work, the Expert Group found a number of 
areas in which improvements could be made. It identified clear 
governance issues for UKBA with regard to the commissioning of 
healthcare services and the quality assurance (QA) mechanisms used 
nationally and locally, as well as current QA processes which focus on 
adherence to jurisdictional procedure. Any commissioned clinical 
pathways/protocols must be in keeping with GMC guidance and 
requirements and UKBA should remain vigilant in ensuring that this is 
the case. 
 
Issues were also found around the contracting of FPs and healthcare 
professionals, as well as the training of custody staff and UKBA 
subcontracted employees. It will be important for UKBA to ensure 
appropriate training for permanent and contracted custody staff as 
part of the protocols to be developed under the recommendations. 
 
Whilst UKBA will be responsible for implementing the majority of the 
recommendations contained in this guidance, there are relevant 
considerations for other organisations. Alongside UKBA, The Royal 
College of Physicians (RCP) will need to consider how to develop the 
recommended clinical pathways and protocols, together with the 
involvement of Forensic Physicians and the Faculty of Forensic and 
Legal Medicine, expert toxicological advice, other national professional 
authorities for nurses and other Health Care Professionals, and health 
service providers. As any clinical pathways/protocols that are 
developed by the RCP should be in keeping with GMC guidance and 
requirements, the GMC should be kept informed and asked for advice 
and comment where relevant. 
 
In implementing these recommendations, all authorities must take into 
account the general ethical principles to ensure that the welfare of 
suspected SIDTs is the primary concern of all those who come into 
contact with them.  
 
As the new arrangements for commissioning health care emerge, there 
will need to be clarity over the commissioning of services for offender 
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health in the future, with clearer definition of the respective roles of 
UKBA and/or the NHS Commissioning Board, particularly with respect 
to responsibility, accountability, standards and quality of care. Further 
information about the NHS Reforms and Commissioning of services is 
given in the Background chapter. 
 
Finally, to help predict the implications of implementing these 
recommendations and subsequent policy development, UKBA may find 
it beneficial to evaluate the available historical data on the numbers of 
SIDTs held annually in the different custodial settings in the UK, 
together with information on numbers referred and/or admitted to 
hospital. Evaluation of the current UKBA estate of custodial suites, 
transport facilities and other settings in which SIDT are managed 
during the pathway from apprehending to completion of detention will 
also be needed. This data is not collected routinely and the Expert 
Group was unable to evaluate these aspects fully as a consequence.  
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Summary of Recommendations 
 
The recommendations of the Expert Group are listed in full as follows: 
 
1. UKBA and healthcare professionals should use agreed and 
consistent language and terminology, pertaining to specific methods of 
smuggling, when referring to the population denoted as SIDTs.  
 
2. UKBA should review compliance with Ionising Radiation regulations, 
particularly with respect to the use of low dose body scanners and 
other equipment used outside health care settings. 
 
3. UKBA should commission, with advice from Medical Royal Colleges 
and the UK Departments of Health, the development of detailed clinical 
pathways and standardised national protocols for the healthcare of 
SIDTs in custody. These pathways should include a Custodial Early 
Warning System (CEWS) for use in the custodial environment, and 
conventional Modified Early Warning System (MEWS) for use in health 
care environments; guidance on rapid access referral for transfer of 
SIDTs to appropriate receiving hospitals/provider units; and detail 
specific circumstances when medical or other healthcare professional 
advice should be sought. Attention should also be given to the care of 
SIDTs with mental health issues or impaired capacity, women who 
may be pregnant, minors and other vulnerable individuals.  
 
Future decisions regarding the commissioning of health services 
relating to individuals in UKBA custody will be assisted by the 
development of such clinical pathways and protocols.   
 
4. Body-Packers should be only detained in custody if constant 
observation with CEWS scoring can be provided and any observed 
changes acted upon immediately. There must be available rapid access 
to an emergency department with acute surgical facilities and all 
necessary emergency drugs and equipment available twenty-four 
hours, seven days a week. Staff should be fully trained to use both the 
equipment and to administer these drugs. If these facilities and trained 
staff are not available, Body-Packers must be referred immediately to 
an emergency department with acute surgical facilities available 
twenty-four hours, seven days a week. 
 
5. A standard list of medical equipment and medication should be 
provided in custody suites where SIDTs are held. The medication and 
equipment provided (including automatic defibrillators) should be in 
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stock, in date, and serviced according to the manufacturer’s 
specification. 
 
6. Appropriate training for custody staff, both permanent and 
contracted, should be introduced as a part of the standardised national 
protocols for the care of SIDTs in Recommendation 3. This should 
include the use of CEWS, and be introduced to allow the identification 
of individuals at high risk, the adequate monitoring of detainees, and 
the early identification of signs of toxicity. 
 
7. UKBA should ensure that staff are competent in recognising signs of 
drug intoxication, including acute cocaine toxicity, as well as 
understanding the requirements of duty of care. All custodial staff 
(permanent and contracted) should be trained in Basic Life Support, 
recognition of the signs and symptoms of drug intoxication and other 
common clinical conditions. 
 
8. All Health Care Professionals working in UKBA environments should 
ensure that they hold a current Immediate Life Support (ILS) 
certificate with additional training in the recognition and management 
of conditions presenting in custody. 
 
9. Consideration should be given to the feasibility of developing a 
small number of specialist units attached to hospitals, which 
incorporate arrangements for temporary custody and the medical 
observation of SIDTs. This represents the safest option in that it would 
concentrate specialist facilities and expertise in a few sites, but would 
require significant change to the current distributed arrangements, 
including a co-located (temporary) custodial environment. 
 
10. The Royal College of Physicians, through the Faculty of Forensic 
and Legal Medicine, should develop a postgraduate education 
programme for FPs, covering the medical care of SIDTs in custody. 
This should be considered as a mandatory element of Continuing 
Professional Development for those in the specialty working in 
environments where SIDTs may be encountered in order to ensure 
that FPs working in different settings have a common level of essential 
knowledge and skill. 
 
11. UKBA should review current information supplied to detainees and 
arrangements for independent advocacy and respect for human rights. 
  
12. Forensic physicians independently retained by UKBA must be 
contracted as self-employed individuals.  
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Background Information & Glossary of Terms 
 
UK Border Agency (UKBA) 
 
The United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA) was created in law in April 
2008 and established as a result of the Borders, Citizens and 
Immigration Act 2009. The Agency integrated the work of the Border 
and Immigration Agency, UK Visas and the border-related 
responsibilities of HM Revenue and Customs to create a single 
authority for immigration and customs control and to tackle 
smuggling, immigration crime and border tax fraud. This includes 
responsibility for the operational enforcement of prohibitions and 
restrictions on the import and export of goods including drugs, HMRC’s 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act custodial functions and facilities, and 
the attendant responsibility for the detention and care of those 
suspected of smuggling drugs. UKBA is a Home Office agency 
operating across the UK that is accountable to the UK Parliament. 
UKBA operates under the different legislative frameworks for England 
and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland. 
  
The Expert Group was informed that UKBA has approximately 8,000 
officers in the Border Force directorate, which is responsible for 
ensuring that only legitimate travellers and goods are allowed to enter 
and leave the UK. The targeting and interdiction of Class A drugs is a 
priority for the Border Force directorate. UKBA takes a targeted, risk-
based, approach to intervention that is informed by intelligence 
gathered from a variety of sources. Trace detection technology and X-
ray, as well as detector dogs, are used to scan and examine baggage, 
vehicles and freight in order to detect drug smuggling.  
 
A significant proportion of the Class A drugs detected by UKBA are 
smuggled by SIDTs, who therefore constitute a significant proportion 
of UKBA detainees. Of the 508 detainees remanded in custody in the 
HMRC suite at Heathrow between September 2006 and August 2007, 
159 (almost one in three) were SIDTs. Specific information about the 
geographical origin and reasons for the drugs trafficking activity of 
SIDTs is outside the remit of this guidance.   
 
In recent years, internal drug smuggling has become an issue in 
Northern Ireland where UKBA has noted an increase in SIDTs, 
particularly in Belfast. Whilst it is a small number in comparison to the 
UK mainland, the city is now ranked third for the highest number of 
SIDT arrivals. UKBA informed the Expert Group that predicting future 
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trends in the numbers of SIDTs held in UKBA custody would be 
difficult. 
 
 
Jurisdictional and Legislative Context 
 
The legislative context has changed since HMRC requested advice from 
the CMO, and there are have been associated changes in jurisdictional 
responsibility.  
 
The Police & Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) outlines the measures 
and safeguards available to those under investigation who are 
suspected of committing a criminal offence. Section 114 of PACE 
enables application of the provisions of PACE to investigations 
conducted by officers of UKBA, whilst section 22 of the Borders, 
Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 further applies PACE to customs 
investigations carried out by UKBA. Similar provision exists in Northern 
Ireland by way of the Police & Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) 
Order 1989, whilst the powers of UKBA officers in Scotland are 
contained in Part III of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 
1995. 
 
PACE Codes of Practice are relevant here, particularly those issued 
under sections 60, 60A and 66, dealing with issues such as searches of 
premises (Code B), detention of suspects (Code C) and the conduct of 
interviews (Code E). Code of Practice C is relevant to the care of SIDTs 
and contains specific guidance on the care of SIDTs in paragraph 9.3.57  
 
Further guidance is available in the 2006 Guidance on the Safer 
Detention & Handling of Persons in Police Custody. Whilst the Codes of 
Practice have been approved by Parliament, and PACE has the force of 
law as primary legislation, the Safer Detention guidance has no force 
in law. However, this is a source of reference to both officers carrying 
out custody functions and to anyone charged with investigating any 
incident in a custody suite, including a death in custody. 
 
The Drugs Act 2005 modifies the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984 (PACE, specifically section 55 as 55(1)(a). The Corporate 
Manslaughter and Homicide Act 2007 will apply in all custody areas 
from the summer of 2011, and any ‘system failure’ resulting in the 
death of a detainee will leave responsible individuals in these areas 
liable to a potential charge of manslaughter. 
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Application of PACE to UKBA as set out above, means that all of these 
documents would have equivalent force in respect of investigations 
and detentions by officers of UKBA as in regard to police officers. 
 
 
NHS Reforms 
 
Following the current re-structuring of the NHS and health service 
provision, the newly formed NHS Commissioning Board will 
commission health care services for people in prison and other 
custodial settings, high security psychiatric services and the armed 
forces, although precise arrangements as to how this will work are yet 
to be defined.  Public health services for people in prison and other 
custodial settings will become the responsibility of the newly 
established public health service, Public Health England.  
 
The way in which offender and prison health services are 
commissioned is also changing. Implementation of reforms following 
The Bradley Report in the 43 police forces in England and Wales has 
resulted in a review of the feasibility of transferring the budgetary and 
commissioning responsibility from the Home Office to the NHS.58   
Following Ministerial approval, this is likely to be a phased approach at 
a local level resulting in the move of healthcare provision to being 
commissioned by the NHS.  
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Glossary & Abbreviated Terms 
 
Body-Stuffers - Individuals who swallow a small number of packages 
containing an illicit drug, usually heroin, cocaine, cannabis or an 
amphetamine, in an unplanned attempt to conceal evidence when on 
the verge of being arrested. 
 
Body-Packers - Individuals who swallow a substantial number of 
packages containing illicit drugs for the purpose of smuggling 
(sometimes called ‘mules’ or ‘swallowers’). 
 
Body-Pushers - Individuals who hide illicit drug packages in the rectum 
or vagina in an unplanned attempt to conceal evidence when on the 
verge of being arrested 
 
Forensic Medical Examiner (FME) – See FP 
 
FP – Forensic Physician (formally referred to as Forensic Medical 
Examiners) 
 
HCP – Healthcare Professional 
 
Mules - See ‘Body-Packers’ 
 
PACE - Police & Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
 
PER - Person Escort Record - Form that is completed whenever a UKBA 
detainee is moved, and accompanying them in transit. 
 
SIDT - Suspected Internal Drug Trafficker. 
 
Swallowers - See ‘Body-Packers’ 
 
UKBA – UK Border Agency 
 
HMRC – HM Revenue & Customs 
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Terms of Reference                
 
In order to assist HM Revenue and Customs develop clinically sound 
polices, the expert group on the medical care of suspected internal 
drug traffickers whilst in custody is asked to: 
 
Produce guidance on the medical care of suspected internal drug 
traffickers for consideration by the Chief Medical Officer. 
 
In particular, the guidance should cover: 
 
• Identification of individuals in custody at high risk of adverse 
health events, taking into account any views expressed by HM 
Coroners 
    
• Stratification of risk and the provision of advice on appropriate 
care regimes     
 
• Appropriate standards of care for all suspected internal drug 
traffickers         
 
• Circumstances in which medical opinion should be sought and 
from whom such advice should be sought 
 
• Circumstances in which HMRC should require advice concerning 
the admission to hospital of an individual in custody  
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